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It is hard to imagine that there has been another time, or industry, in which regula-
tors have been faced with a more challenging task than f inancial regulators face now, 
with respect to f intech. How do we ‘future proof ’ ourselves, our regulations, this 
book?
Private sector innovation is tricky for regulators at the best of times. Whether we are 
speaking of cryptocurrencies, biotechnology, the platformisation of the economy or any 
number of other phenomena, the trajectory that innovation takes is unpredictable. It 
evolves in unexpected directions. Today’s hot new technology may be tomorrow’s dead 
letter. New technologies, new players and new effects seemingly emerge from nowhere, 
carrying unexpected and sometimes hard-to-recognise new risks with them. Regulators 
can be caught flat-footed, focusing on the wrong things as their assumptions and their 
jurisdiction prove to be out of sync with actual facts on the ground.
Moreover, financial innovation is especially tricky. Intangible products are essentially 
concepts, not physical objects. This makes them exceptionally fast-moving, mutable and 
almost infinitely variable. They also actually alter markets when they enter them, in ways 
that can be difficult to predict. Fintech – whether developed by venture capital-funded 
non-bank startups, or by global financial institutions with substantial resources and 
multijurisdictional options, or by global ‘Bigtech’ companies like Amazon or Facebook 
or Ant Financial – often crosses the increasingly arbitrary-looking regulatory boundaries 
that we drew in an earlier era around ‘banking’, or ‘finance’. And fintech is evolving at 
such a pace that it is difficult even for experts in the field to keep up.
Responding to this challenge demands that regulators reorient their perspectives, 
to locate innovation at the center of their regulatory models. Regulators and scholars 
must come to terms with the extraordinary f luidity and contingency in which they 
are forced to operate. Rather than heroically trying to nail down clear boundaries 
and guidelines for f intech, which would be akin to trying to wallpaper over a moving 
object, regulators must recognise their and their systems’ profound vulnerability to 
change, and then build regulatory responses that can manage it. This is not the same 
thing as simply celebrating private sector innovation through mechanisms such as the 
regulator-sponsored ‘sandbox’, and it is not the same thing as deregulation. Instead, it 
requires recognising that private sector innovation is actually the single most profound 
challenge that regulators must confront. Their f irst question in any decision-making 
environment should be, ‘how is private sector innovation, in this case f intech, under-
mining my assumptions, changing relationships, denaturing products and markets, 
and seeping around regulatory definitions and boundaries, right now?’
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2 What, about fintech, is genuinely new?
Fintech is sometimes described as the digitisation of the financial industry. It is the appli-
cation of information technology, internet communications capacity, increased computing 
speed and programming capacity and sometimes ‘big data’ to traditional financial institu-
tional functions, in areas as wide-ranging as corporate finance (eg, peer-to-peer lending 
and crowdfunding), personal finance and financial management, financial data analytics and 
investing (eg, algorithmic trading, index funds, robo-advising), mediums of exchange and 
record-keeping (eg, cryptocurrency, distributed ledger technology) and mobile payments 
and e-commerce. Fintech initiatives are developing new business models, products and ser-
vices, thereby targeting traditional business models – particularly banking models – and the 
institutions that rely on them. For its proponents, fintech is promising because it stands to 
lower the barriers to entry to these sectors and to reduce costs within them, making banking 
more inclusive and efficient, including for those in the Global South. The decentralisation, 
de-institutionalisation and destabilisation that we have seen operating in other areas where 
technology has disrupted a sector are also present here, as, more recently, is the orientation 
towards making the consumer experience as frictionless as possible.
How should financial regulators approach fintech? Are there, for example, useful paral-
lels between fintech and the financial engineering rage that preceded the financial crisis that 
reached its peak in 2008? Can we learn from that hard experience? In a broad sense, the 
answer is yes: both are examples of private sector innovation that fundamentally challenges 
existing regulatory structures. In its specifics, however, the answer may be no: financial 
engineering was about the creation of new financial products, which operated with an 
unexpected degree of interconnectedness and systemic significance, and thus posed under-
appreciated new risks. Certainly, those same concerns exist with respect to some fintech too – 
consider, especially, value tokens that are embedded into distributed ledger technology, as 
Ethereum and Bitcoin are embedded in their blockchains.
However, fintech also potentially undermines financial regulatory concepts in an 
additional, novel way. Much fintech comes down to the application of disintermediat-
ing and disruptive tech tools and business processes to finance, and this is new. The 
institutional structures and categorising assumptions that regulators have relied on, 
and that have shaped and defined the fundamental businesses of banking (deposits 
and lending), securities (investment and investment advising, and efficient capital allo-
cation) and insurance (risk spreading), can no longer be taken for granted. Financial 
 engineering before the financial crisis also undermined the traditional institution- 
oriented  distinctions between banking, securities and insurance. This much we have 
seen before. However, fintech has the potential to generate entirely new ways of engaging 
with  consumers, which burst the bounds of financial regulation entirely. Moreover, the 
techno-optimists that are building fintech products do not necessarily take as a given the 
idea that the financial markets are complex and should not be cavalierly ‘disrupted’; 
that a reliable financial system requires intermediaries; that prudential regulation need 
be imposed on financial institutions; that there are natural boundaries around the 
‘business of banking’; or that the concept of a ‘security’ is internally coherent or even 
useful, in a digital world.
Fintech also implicates other areas of regulation in a way that pre-crisis financial 
engineering did not to the same degree. Certainly, the financial crisis taught us about 
the unexpected interplay between, for example, capital adequacy rules and US federal 
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bankruptcy provisions, among other relationships. We understand clearly now that finan-
cial products and markets do not operate in silos. However, fintech could have even 
broader implications. If adopted at scale, cryptocurrencies could actually limit sover-
eigns’ ability to make and implement monetary policy. Even after having been scaled 
down following regulatory concerns, a complicated new product with the potential to 
be applied at scale, such as Facebook’s Libra cryptocurrency (and its Colibra Novi digital 
wallet), could have effects on areas as disparate as monetary policy, money laundering, 
privacy, data ownership and security and securities regulation. Seemingly lightweight 
online consumer financial products, which help with personal finance tasks like budg-
eting, managing student loan payments or facilitating credit card transactions for small 
businesses (consider Revolut, Robinhood, Square and others), may in fact manage to cap-
ture profitable e-commerce functions. In the United States, through novel agreements 
with small state banks to provide the back-end depository and credit functions that sup-
port e-commerce, those lightweight ‘apps’ could become key money-movers within the 
economy, in the way that banks traditionally have been, without necessarily impinging on 
what American federal regulators would consider to be the regulated ‘business of bank-
ing’. (Some, like Square and Varo, obtained FDIC licenses themselves in 2020.) Clayton 
Christensen’s well-known description of the ‘disruptive innovator’, who starts with low-
value marginal business lines and then incrementally creeps up the value chain and ulti-
mately overthrows Goliath incumbents, may be instructive when it comes to these kinds 
of players.1 Piecemeal regulatory responses miss that larger context. On the other end of 
the institutional continuum, global financial institutions, which sit on a treasure trove of 
data about their depositors, consumers and investors, could be poised to be significant 
players in an informational market which raises significant concerns about privacy, sur-
veillance and even human dignity. These are not problems that financial regulators have 
typically had to confront.
Getting one’s arms around this kind of challenge requires more robust and effective 
data-gathering and analytical capacities than many financial regulators have, even now, 
more than a decade after the financial crisis. It also requires that regulators recognise that 
they are dealing with genuinely epistemological questions on a daily basis; that is, they are 
continually confronted with the awkward fact that they do not know what they do not 
know. Fortunately, as uncomfortable as this may be, at least this recognition means that 
regulators are oriented towards the most difficult challenge they face.
In spite of the magnitude of this challenge, it is not insurmountable. What regula-
tors need to do is to put financial innovation at the very center of their thinking – to 
systematically and continually inquire, as a first order question, into how fintech inno-
vation is reshaping its environment, challenging regulatory jurisdiction and undermin-
ing assumptions. This is not to displace regulators’ traditional responsibilities to, for 
example, ensure banks’ safety and soundness, to protect investors and consumers or to 
foster fair and efficient capital markets. Rather, this innovation-ready orientation is the 
lens through which these regulatory responsibilities should be seen, in order to make 
regulation effective.
The sections below outline a roadmap through which regulators can begin to grapple 
with fintech, as a particularly challenging form of private sector innovation. It offers a 
 1 See generally Clayton M Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great 
Firms to Fail (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1997).
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systematic way of thinking about how innovation could be transforming their industries, 
and how they might respond.2 It is based on four basic questions, each of which is discussed 
further below:
• What does the regulator know about the fintech that is emerging in its sector, and how 
does it know it? What does it not know?
• How is regulation structured with regard to fintech, and what flows from these struc-
tural choices?
• What mechanisms are in place within the regulator to make it adaptable, resilient and 
capable of learning through monitoring and experience?
• What strategic choices are available to the regulator in thinking about how to frame 
and interpret a particular fintech innovation?
3 What does the regulator know and how does 
it know it? What does it not know?
Regulators and regulatory scholars are not, generally, experts in how innovation devel-
ops. Even innovative private actors – who may focus considerable energy on fostering an 
innovative corporate culture, or creating a novel product – are not generally experts in 
how private sector innovation operates at a larger scale, thereby influencing the econ-
omy and altering social behaviour. And yet, understanding some of the basics of how 
innovation moves as a phenomenon is an essential starting point for regulators, who are 
continually required to retrofit their structures, institutions and interpretations in order 
to recognise and adapt to new innovation-related challenges. For this we must turn to 
organisational sociologists, financial geographers and other relatively unfamiliar disci-
plines. Below is some of what they can tell us.3
3.1 Networks and nodes
Innovation scholars will tell us that innovation is a social, not an individual, phenomenon. 
It clusters in particular locations, within which particular actors emerge as ‘nodes’ within 
a network. Scholars have mapped networks of institutional relationships with a view to 
understanding how risk and contagion spread. New computer modelling has demonstrated 
how networks can be based on institutional connections, products, and markets. A net-
work approach is newly being applied to financial regulation.4 What is sometimes missed, 
however, is the degree to which networks for the transmission and diffusion of ideas and 
innovation can be, in consequential ways, intensely interpersonal, contingent and social.
Whether or not their innovations are the best innovations, nodes are especially influen-
tial in transmitting ideas. This is both because they are connected to a greater proportion 
of the other actors in the network, and because simply being recognised as a node generates 
a level of social capital that causes other actors to accord their ideas greater respect and 
 2 The roadmap is based on Chapter 9 of Cristie Ford, Innovation and the State: Finance, Regulation, and 
Justice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
 3 For more, see supra Cristie Ford, Chapters 6–8.
 4 See eg, Luca Enriques, ‘Network-Sensitive Financial Regulation’ (2020) 45 J Corp L 351–398.
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gravitas – to question less, and to accept on faith more. This was the case in the financial 
crisis, for example, when buyers as far away from high finance as northern Norwegian 
municipalities purchased complex financial products like CDOs from financial institutions 
on Wall Street and in the City of London. As financial geographer Roger Lee notes,
At that distance, decisions appear to have been made on the ‘reputations’ of offer-
ing banks, the claimed superior innovativeness of Anglo-American markets and the 
rumour-mill of actions taken by competing banks in other jurisdictions. Whereas insti-
tutions involved in currency trading have had to develop rigorous checks […] on a 
24/7/365 basis, this type of discipline was apparently not applied to participation in 
exotic products.5
Regulators should therefore ask themselves, with a view to understanding innovation and 
its diffusion: what do both the institutional and social fintech networks look like, in my 
jurisdiction and beyond? Where are the nodes? Crucially, financial innovation is salient even 
when it is not officially labelled ‘fintech’ by, for example, a government-sponsored sandbox 
or an investor. Fintech is also operating across the classic institutional divisions of bank-
ing, securities and insurance. It is operating across jurisdictions. It is developing organi-
cally, with more energy directed towards some areas of finance – e-commerce Application 
Programming Interfaces (better known as APIs), cross-border remittances, distributed 
ledger technology. Fintech is also bursting the bounds of financial regulation altogether, as 
when it deploys financial institutions’ deep data sources to, for example, kick off AI-fueled 
new ventures. Regulators must make decisions about what kind of fintech to concentrate 
on, and at what scale. A regulator approaching a fintech problem must make some clear 
choices about who its regulated community is, and then must map the relevant network’s 
typology and determine where the institutional and social nodes are. This information will 
help identify how the most disruptive phenomena will develop and diffuse, allowing the 
regulator to concentrate its efforts in a risk-based regulatory fashion.
That said, one analytical starting point is geography: a great deal of fintech activity 
takes place in London, New York, Silicon Valley and Singapore. (To repeat, whether the 
geographic approach is optimal for any particular regulatory strategy is something that the 
regulator in question must decide, not just assume.) Fintech in London and Singapore in 
particular is supported by official ‘sandboxes’, within which fintech innovators can exper-
iment, unfettered by the usual regulatory restrictions, with new ideas. These are potential 
fonts of innovation and insight. Regulators should also not overlook the expanding set 
of private ‘fintech sandboxes’ offered by venture capital-funded non-profits, management 
consultants, self-regulatory organisations and others. If they are succeeding, many of these 
sandboxes should be generating innovative networks. An especially active sandbox like the 
one operated by the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority is likely generating 
multiple interlocking networks. The sandboxes themselves, including the leading private 
actors operating within them, are likely to be network nodes. The ideas they test out within 
a fintech sandbox are likely to have effects – including potentially subtle or indirect ones – 
that could pop up in unexpected places.
 5 Roger Lee et al, ‘The Remit of Financial Geography – Before and After the crisis’ (2009) 9 J Econ Geog 
723–747.
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Venture capital funds (and their new competitors, corporate venture capital funds – a 
form of venture capital where the corporate funds of large public companies like Intel, 
GlaxoSmithKline, Citigroup and GE are directly invested in external private companies 
in their sectors) are also potential nodes. These investors could be sector-specific nodes, 
and others could be more geographically localised nodes. Regulators will want to work 
out whether these VCs and CVCs can be leverage points to manage information flow or 
regulatory compliance from the fintechs in which they invest. Potentially, given appropriate 
incentives, some of them could even potentially serve as what Neil Gunningham and his 
coauthors have described as ‘regulatory intermediaries’.6 These are private parties (or insur-
ers, industry associations or others similarly situated) that have the necessary relationships 
and their own endogenous reasons to want to ensure that the smaller parties with whom 
they interact, in this case fintech startups, comply with regulation. If investors are not oper-
ating as nodes for whatever reason, are there other potential nodes, or can other (perhaps 
government-sponsored) nodes be established?
Innovation scholarship indicates that focusing on network nodes can do dispropor-
tionate work in gathering information, and in influencing non-node actors as well. Put 
another way, it better reflects the risk, including systemic risk, that those actors present 
as a function of their nodal position. If sufficiently granular, well-calibrated network- 
sensitive regulation can be put in place, it can help alleviate potential concerns about arbi-
trage by, or disproportionate impact upon those nodes.7 The approach is not infallible, 
since innovation is unpredictable. In a world of unlimited resources, regulators could 
be engaging in sweeping environmental scans across all areas where potentially influen-
tial fintech innovations may arise. Yet real-life regulators faced with resource constraints 
would do well to concentrate their resources towards network nodes, because of the 
disproportionate influence that those nodes are likely to have. Understanding the fintech 
networks that are operating will also allow regulators to better predict and track potential 
fintech diffusions, which are also important. By closely tracking the kinds of innovations 
that are occurring and diffusing from the nodes in particular, a resource-constrained 
real-life regulator will be in a relatively good position to recognise the innovations that 
are more likely to have broad influence.
3.2 Who is innovating?
In addition to understanding innovators’ positions within a network, regulators should pay 
attention to those innovators’ characteristics. Who, exactly, are the main fintech innovators 
in this space? What do regulators know about them, and how do they know it?
For example, large incumbent financial institutions will be players in fintech, and the par-
ticular way in which they engage with it will be a function of who they, organisationally 
and historically, are. In general, innovation scholarship tells us that their innovations are 
more likely to reflect the incumbent’s own worldview, if that is not too grand a word, and its 
understanding of its business and its industry. The story of Xerox’s Palo Alto Research Center 
(PARC) is probably familiar to many, as an example of an incumbent being hobbled by inter-
nal hierarchy and a narrow understanding of its own business. By the late 1970s, researchers 
 6 Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair, Leaders and Laggards: Next-Generation Environmental 
Regulation (Sheffield: Greenleaf, 2002).
 7 See supra note 4.
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at PARC had developed several new technologies including a personal computer, email, a 
graphic user interface (with pull-down menus and icons), and an improved computer mouse. 
Xerox failed to capitalise on any of these advances, in part simply because it understood itself 
as a printing-on-paper business that would be threatened by the arrival of a paperless office. 
PARC may be an extreme example, and one from which other incumbents have learned, but 
the inevitable conceptual torque imposed by an existing business does not ever entirely go 
away. (Some large financial institutions, notably in London, try to get around the limitations 
of their legacy culture by creating their own spinoff fintech ‘startups’.)
Incumbents are also more likely to be influenced by long familiarity with the rules that 
govern their industries, and to have ongoing institutional and interpersonal relationships 
with their regulators and with other key players. These are valuable assets. At the same 
time, this embeddedness in the existing order suggests that incumbents are perhaps less 
likely to be profoundly, epistemologically disruptive. Incumbents also generally possess 
substantial resources and, in many cases, have the market power to absorb or destroy new-
comers. It seems that even startups that operate in an incumbent-dominated ecosystem are 
more likely to try to ‘change the system from within’: this is a commonly remarked upon 
difference between Silicon Alley fintechs in New York, who (stereotypically) want to work 
with and sell to existing big banks, and Silicon Valley fintechs, who (stereotypically) want 
to eliminate them.
Neither incumbent players nor their regulators are necessarily in an ideal position to 
register the significance of other, more disruptive, genuinely ‘outsider’ innovators in their 
space. In fintech, these are many. In the United States, with its fractured regulatory struc-
ture, multiple fast-growing companies in the personal finance and e-commerce spaces are 
shattering the atom of the traditional banking function, and seizing some client-facing 
aspects of financial intermediation, all without being subject to banking (or much other) 
regulation. Does the relevant financial regulator know who these players are, how they 
operate, and what drives their innovations? Does it have a strategy for identifying new ones 
as they emerge? How does the regulator gather such information? Are its information- 
gathering resources appropriate and effective? (Particular regulatory structures and their 
implications are discussed in the next section, below.)
In fintech, the third and potentially most destabilising set of players are American 
Bigtech companies such as Facebook, Amazon, Apple and Google (as well as enormous 
Chinese companies like Tencent, which operates WeChat; and Alibaba Group, which 
operates Ant Financial/Alipay). Large financial institutions regularly identify Bigtechs, 
not small fintech startups, as their most significant potential competitors. Like the pro-
verbial iceberg, most of the work that Bigtechs do is outside any financial regulator’s 
jurisdiction. Yet, the influence and resources that fuel Bigtechs also influence their sali-
ence and potential for success inside the financial regulator’s jurisdictional bubble.8 Their 
connection to the purchasing, searching, and other online behaviour that consumers 
already engage in is an asset. Financial regulators should not assume that innovations 
such as Alipay, Google Pay and the like will be the end of those Bigtechs’ desires to oper-
ate in the financial arena. These companies’ priorities and worldviews will govern their 
behaviour; understanding those priorities and worldviews will therefore be important to 
 8 Bank for International Settlements Annual Economic Report, ‘Big Tech in Finance: Opportunities 
and Risks’ (BIS, 23 June 2019) <https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2019e3.pdf> accessed 10 March 
2020.
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regulators as they seek to understand what is happening to traditional financial business 
models. Regulators may need significant new resources to track the Bigtechs’ movements 
within regulated space.
One of the large priorities for regulators is identifying gaps in their knowledge, and 
limits to their sources of information. For example, if the regulator is getting most of its 
information from people with whom it has a relationship, meaning the larger incumbent 
players, it may be missing the important effects of fintech startups nibbling at the edges 
of those incumbents’ businesses. Operating based on information from incumbents also 
potentially discounts concerns about actors that seem to be of a very different nature, like 
a Bigtech company, which does not ‘look’ like a familiar financial institution. Regulators 
should be conscious of the limits of their own vision. As well, they should scrutinise their 
own processes. For example, is information flow within a regulatory organisation hierarchi-
cal and centralised, or do its institutional structures allow information to flow from more 
junior staffers, or those who were hired for their unique expertise, and whose perspectives 
may not be so constrained by familiarity and history?
3.3 What are the innovations?
In addition to asking who is innovating, regulators should ask what they know about 
potentially innovative products in their spaces: cross-border remittances and e-commerce 
APIs, for example, are different even while both are retail customer-facing. As of this 
writing, there is a great deal of fintech activity taking place around payment processing, 
an area that will have implications for banking, money laundering, e-commerce, and 
potentially antitrust regulation. Are regulators equipped to consider the potential impact 
of this innovation in these areas? How do regulators plan to learn about the next ‘big 
thing’ in fintech? (Regulatory sandboxes, as a strategy for obtaining good information 
about new developments, are among the regulatory structures discussed in the next sec-
tion, below.)
3.4 What is the context?
Background environmental factors influence the nature and trajectory of innovative prod-
ucts. Knowledge about industry context and market matters. For example, is there in this 
area of fintech development, as there is in finance, a strong first mover advantage? In the 
run up to the financial crisis, this caused the pace of innovation to accelerate. Combined 
with a deep market thirst for any product that could generate a better-than-average return, 
it produced scores of ‘innovative’ financial products that did little to actually perfect mar-
kets or generate actual value.
What contexts operate in fintech? Do so-called network effects (‘I’m on this social media 
platform because everyone else is on this social media platform’) incentivise particular 
fintech platforms to scale up as quickly as possible? Or, is there a volume of unbanked 
and underbanked individuals who can constitute a new market for more accessible fintech 
products? Are there (rent-seeking) intermediaries whose work can easily be replicated or 
circumvented, in the way that index funds are reducing employment opportunities for 
stock-pickers? Lawyers, real estate agents, mortgage lenders and others similarly situated 
may fall into this category for some fintechs’ purposes. Are traditional financial institutions 
operating in a mature market where there is little room for growth, thereby prompting 
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moves into new business lines? (This may be the case among the Big Four banks in Australia, 
which are moving aggressively into other areas of technology where their deep data banks 
can be an asset.) Are any of the players involved in fintech focusing their efforts on owning 
the platform on which other actors’ financial transactions must take place?9
The fintech market will be different in different jurisdictional and business environments. 
It is also different on the consumer-facing side, and the logistical back-end – where there 
are significant prizes to be gained in providing systems and interfaces between players. It is 
different at the retail level, and at the wholesale level. Each of these unique environments 
needs to be understood if regulators wish to be able to recognise, and ideally anticipate, the 
ways in which fintech innovation could proceed.
4 Regulatory structure and implications
Regulatory design matters. Whether a regulatory regime operates on, for example, an ex 
ante compliance-oriented model or an ex post enforcement-oriented model will influence 
its engagement with industry in myriad ways. Whether it is principles-based and risk- 
oriented, whether it anticipates a cooperative relationship with most industry players, 
whether it is disclosure-oriented or tightly prescriptive, whether and how it relies on 
thresholds and licensing mechanisms – all of these considerations will affect how reg-
ulation operates within its space. In thinking about a private sector innovation-related 
challenge like fintech, however, two aspects of regulatory design are especially relevant: 
the boundaries of regulatory jurisdiction, and the assumptions that are built into the 
regulatory regime.
4.1 Regulatory boundaries
The jurisdictional boundaries of a particular regulator mean that it only has authority 
over a particular region and subject matter. Influences from outside its regulatory bound-
aries can have a considerable effect within them, even while those outside forces are not 
amenable to the regulator’s control. In the United States, the dual banking system and the 
fractured regulatory environment cause problems for visibility and responsiveness, which 
ought to demand a more coordinated set of responses. In fintech globally, cooperative 
efforts across jurisdictions, like the Global Financial Innovation Network (GFIN), can help 
to mitigate this challenge. But even if all of this were in place, there are deeper, cognitive 
and epistemological, challenges associated with boundaries that a fintech-oriented regula-
tor should be aware of.
Regulatory boundaries quite literally affect what a regulator can see, and not see. 
Every regulator operates from a particular set of assumptions, and with a particular ‘focal 
object’ in mind.10 Regulatory jurisdiction is established with those focal objects in mind 
so that, for example, securities regulation operates most cleanly when it is dealing with the 
straightforward corporate share for which it was initially designed. Its application to other 
kinds of financial instruments, such as derivatives or crypto tokens, operates by analogy 
to that central, focal object. (Consider the way in which the United States Securities and 
 9 Lina M Khan, ‘Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox’ (2017) 126 Yale L J 710–805.
10 See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Post-Modern Conception of 
Law’ (1987) 14 JL & Soc’y 279–302.
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Exchange Commission (SEC) asserted jurisdiction over digital assets distributed through 
an Initial Coin Offering, based – reasonably – on Supreme Court caselaw from the 1940s, 
which described the nature of a particular kind of security called an ‘investment con-
tract’.11) However, the further away from its archetypal product we stray, the more diffi-
cult it is for securities regulation to ‘see’ the new object clearly, and to understand how to 
apply its provisions appropriately.
Thriving on the boundaries of different regulatory zones may be products that seem 
to be neither fish nor fowl, and therefore that raise challenges around comprehensibility 
and regulatability. Importantly, these products may be perfectly ‘legible’ to the market, 
and could grow in use and significance, even while they remain illegible to the regulatory 
structures that should be overseeing them. Swaps were in this liminal place once. Even 
as the market for interest rate and foreign exchange swaps exploded in the United States, 
those swaps remained virtually unregulated for years because the relevant regulators, the 
US SEC and the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission, could not easily slot them 
into the pre-existing regulatory categories of security, future or loan.12 Which other fintech 
products could be seeping between regulatory categories in this way?
Going further, fintech, almost by definition, straddles the realms of financial and non- 
financial business. The banking-commercial separation doctrine, which operates in the 
United States and other jurisdictions (though not in the United Kingdom or Australia), 
imposes a cognitive limitation. The fact that Bigtech companies are not regulated as banks 
or financial institutions means that we may not appreciate how much essentially financial 
business they are actually doing. It also arguably imposes a sense of complacency, about the 
possibility that even federally chartered American banks could be engaging in commercial 
activity, which is belied by the facts.13
On the other side of the coin, the limited scope of financial regulation makes it diffi-
cult to see financial institutions’ businesses as implicating other, non-financial regulatory 
concerns. That is, financial regulators tend not to think a great deal about privacy policy, 
or about whether individuals’ data ought to be an asset that financial institutions can 
exploit for their own gain. Again, this is especially the case in jurisdictions where the 
 banking-commercial separation doctrine is in place. In jurisdictions where it is not – in 
the European Union, the United Kingdom and Australia – banks are now subject to some 
data-oriented requirements. In those jurisdictions, ‘open banking’ initiatives require all 
institutions that offer payment accounts to make their data accessible to regulated third-
party providers, at their customers’ request. Fostering competition and innovation in the 
financial services market is a central goal. The European Commission has recently tabled a 
proposal requiring Bigtech firms to open up their data to smaller rivals as well, with a view 
to reducing barriers to entry for new players.
However, in general, the normative framework around data is still somewhat underde-
veloped: regardless of whether they share their data with other companies, should indi-
viduals be able to prevent financial institutions or Bigtechs from using their data for those 
11 US Securities and Exchange Commission, ‘Framework for “Investment Contact” Analysis of Digital 
Assets’ (US Securities and Exchange Commission, 3 April 2019) <https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/ 
framework-investment-contract-analysis-digital-assets> accessed 10 March 2020.
12 Russell J Funk and Daniel Hirschman, ‘Derivatives and Deregulation: Financial Innovation and the 
Demise of Glass-Steagall’ (2014) 59 Admin Sci Q 669–704.
13 United States, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Controller’s Licensing Manual: Subsidiaries 
and Equity Investments (Washington, 2019).
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companies’ profit, either without permission or generally? Going deeper, is individual con-
trol over their own data, as contemplated under Open Banking and related initiatives, going 
to be adequate to control the associated risks to individuals? Or, should more proactive 
and protective regulatory arrangements be put in place? Are we confident that effectively 
downloading the responsibility for making decisions about personal data use to members of 
the public is likely to protect those members of the public? Securities regulation continues 
to operate in this way: it presumes that information disclosure to ostensibly rational self- 
interested individual investors will protect those investors and create efficient markets. Even 
if we accept that this works in the securities regulatory space, we should not assume that it 
will work in the online service provision space, which is replete with boilerplate contracts 
and consumers’ time-constrained, click-through behaviour. It may instead be time for a 
comprehensive reconsideration of both financial regulation, and personal data privacy reg-
ulation, in a way that better protects the dignity and the interests of us imperfectly rational 
and inevitably time-constrained human beings.
4.2 Regulatory assumptions
Just as no analytical regime can operate without boundaries and priorities, no analytical 
regime can operate without assumptions. They are inevitable and necessary. However, like 
boundaries and focal objects, regulatory assumptions can also affect what we see, and do 
not see.
In the run-up to the financial crisis, regulators made a series of assumptions about the 
new products on offer at the time, which proved to be misplaced. With respect to com-
mercial paper, for example, regulators assumed that the market would self-regulate because 
no one would purchase commercial paper unless it was supported by indicia of soundness. 
Poor-quality commercial paper would be effectively unsellable, and therefore not some-
thing that regulators needed to be concerned about. Regulators also assumed that financial 
institutions would operate in their own rational self-interest, and would not invest in poorly 
understood markets or products at such vast and unsafe levels that they risked destroying 
the entire international financial system. All of these assumptions were, of course, wrong. 
Much of financial regulation – especially securities regulation, but also prudential regula-
tion – still rests on assumptions about transparency and rational self-interest, derived from 
economics, that we now know to be imperfect. As Elinor Ostrom observed in the context 
of common property regimes, when a particular concept – in her account, this concept was 
the famous ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ – is the hammer that one has at hand, then everything 
starts to look like a nail.14 In fact, as she empirically demonstrated, the prisoner’s dilemma 
is not nearly so inevitable as game theory might have us believe. Regulatory assumptions 
are framing devices, and as such are very powerful.
Regulatory assumptions play a particularly prominent role in genuinely new contexts, 
where a regulator cannot rely on past experience, or analogy to comparable examples, to 
make sense of unfamiliar phenomena. Especially in those contexts, regulators will want 
to be alive to the assumptions underlying their regulatory regimes, and to the inevitable 
limits of those assumptions. A financial regulator trying to navigate through the stormy 
waters of rapid and heterogeneous fintech generation will want to regularly check that its 
14 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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assumptions remain sound. It should check, in particular, that it is not overly swayed by 
self-serving industry perspectives, or by a sense that innovation will, somehow, inevitably 
turn out to be socially beneficial. Each of these assumptions was present among key reg-
ulators in the run-up to the financial crisis, and the result was that regulators functionally 
ceded the field to industry actors, with profoundly damaging effects on the global financial 
system. Are regulators making similar assumptions about fintech?
Regulators should articulate in advance – before, for example, establishing a regulatory 
fintech sandbox – what exactly they believe to be in the public interest. Moreover, to be 
clear, people working in well-established financial regulators are not likely to share that 
many background convictions with private sector innovators coming out of a coding, 
‘tech’ environment. This does not automatically delegitimate the regulatory perspec-
tive. Fintech innovators may not, for example, agree that it is in the public interest that 
chartered, traditional banks exist; that sovereign control over monetary policy is a good 
thing; that there may be reasons to shield individuals from unfettered market forces; 
or that regulation (by imperfect human regulators operating within imperfect human 
structures) brings more benefits than it does costs. Even more than in other contexts, 
regulators should not place too much faith in the possibility of what Julia Black once 
called the ‘regulatory Utopia’, within which capable and responsible firms share with 
regulators the goal of optimising all of efficiency, competition and effective public regula-
tion.15 Clear thinking about one’s own assumptions, and clear and unromantic commu-
nication about others’, will be crucial.
4.3 Reflexivity: if you build it, they will come16
Years ago, sociologist Donald McKenzie argued that financial modelling was ‘an engine, 
not a camera’ – meaning that models and assumptions that seemed to be merely descriptive 
were in fact influencing the markets for the things they were describing. He explained how 
a mathematical formula, the Black-Scholes option-pricing model, established a better basis 
for calculating the premium of an option, and thereby its present value. When it was incor-
porated into financial modelling, however, the Black-Scholes formula produced more than 
just an apparent improvement in pricing certainty. It gave options markets credibility and 
legitimacy. It actually transformed how people saw derivatives markets, from something 
akin to gambling, to a far more legitimate-seeming, even noble, method for allocating risk 
and perfecting markets.17 In terms of its potential to be an ‘engine’, the same is at least as 
true of regulation.
Financial systems and markets are constructed, not naturally occurring. A reflexive rela-
tionship exists between regulatory structure and the corresponding creation of particular 
markets, the flourishing of particular products, and the creation of particular risks. In the 
run-up to the financial crisis, for example, the capital adequacy rules that were imposed 
on global financial institutions allowed the largest ones to use their own proprietary risk 
modelling software to determine how much capital they needed to keep on hand. This del-
egation of, essentially, regulatory judgment helped to produce internal systems that severely 
15 Julia Black, ‘Forms and Paradoxes of Principles-Based Regulation’ (2008) 3 Cap Mark L J 425–430.
16 With apologies to the film Field of Dreams, produced by Phil Alden Robinson (Universal, 1989).
17 Donald MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2006).
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under-estimated risk and the need for capital. Moreover, within those capital adequacy 
rules, the fact that certain assets, notably home mortgages, were considered to be ‘safe’ for 
risk-weighting and capital reserve purposes provoked a massive rush by financial institu-
tions into those assets, without any independent assessment of their actual safety.
Regulation changes behaviour, and it provokes innovation in both intentional and 
unintentional, ultimately prosocial and ultimately malign, ways. With regard to fintech, 
we should recognise that government-sponsored fintech sandboxes are intentionally 
 innovation-fostering. If well designed, we should expect that they would produce more 
private sector fintech innovation. As potentially positive as this may be, it will also increase 
the burden on regulators to deal with that innovation.
So: does the presence of a fintech sandbox, which is designed to accelerate fintech 
innovation, also exacerbate the legibility and data problems that regulators face when it 
comes to genuinely new products and services? The answer will very likely come down 
to whether the sandbox has been designed in a way that forces fintech players to provide 
regulators with excellent, ongoing access to top quality, fine-grained, real-time informa-
tion. It is also necessary that regulators have their own considerable and suitable material 
and human resources, and a considerable degree of independent-mindedness, to ensure 
that the regulator is able to keep up with that innovation and the disruption it produces. 
Regulators should not imagine that sandbox structures require them to be less inquis-
itive, less well- resourced or less independent-minded than more traditional regulatory 
rules and categories. On the contrary, sandboxes require more of each of these assets. 
There is hardly a more challenging regulatory task than trying to imagine how to apply 
a set of normative commitments and regulatory goals to entirely new kinds of business, 
in real time.
5 Can the regulator learn and adapt? What 
resources are in place to do that?
In the Welfare State era of top-down, detail-oriented, prescriptive regulatory regimes, 
drafting legislation and its associated regulations tended to be the most difficult part. Once 
drafted, compliance and enforcement personnel had clear marching orders, and the task 
was far simpler.
This is no longer the case. The speed and complexity that characterise financial mar-
kets, and changes in the financial sector, cannot be responded to in such a static  manner. 
International competition for global financial business also provides a clear incentive for 
regulators to develop flexible, context-sensitive, ‘optimised’ regulatory structures that 
impose the least possible regulatory burden on financial industry actors. In this environ-
ment, drafting general principles-based legislation and delegating decision-making author-
ity (including to private actors) is actually the easier part. The far harder part is ensuring 
that such a flexible regime is nevertheless robust and meaningful; that is, that there is the 
back-end capacity needed to gather and digest information, to track and evaluate changes, 
and to learn from experience. This work can be tedious and it is never-ending, but it is 
indispensable. It requires tenacity, commitment and resources. In case after case in financial 
regulation, it is at this implementation stage that efforts fall short.
Implementing innovation-ready regulation in a meaningful way can be difficult for a 
few different reasons. We can underestimate the resources required, or provide the wrong 
kind of resources, or resourcing can dry up over time – something that is especially possible 
during times when things seem to be going well. We can become complacent as markets 
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rise, or as fintech innovations seem to deliver benefits. Regulatory judgment can be swayed 
by self-interested industry framing of issues, or even simply by the social and emotional 
appeal of being pro-innovation, forward-looking, plugged-in. We can fall back on heuris-
tics, assumptions and default rules, for the sake of clarity and comfort, and those shortcuts 
can lead us astray.
With respect to fintech and other fast-moving environments, humans’ cognitive limita-
tions also play a role. As a species, along with the other pitfalls above, it turns out that we 
do not like uncertainty that much, and we are liable to underplay it. We are also not terribly 
good at registering or responding to change. This includes human-generated change. We 
are especially poor at registering incremental change, which by its nature never trips an 
alarm. Fintechs’ incursion into the traditional business of banking may be an innovation of 
this variety. On the other hand, after a high salience disaster has occurred, we suffer from 
hindsight bias and tend to overreact, over-blame and behave reductively. One can imagine 
such a reaction in the event that a popular fintech product were to collapse and harm mem-
bers of the public. We can also be heavily influenced by the hierarchy and strategic priorities 
of the organisations in which we operate. When it comes to fintech in particular, regulators 
should also recognise the interjurisdictional competitiveness that may be pushing them 
towards overeager acceptance of, and perhaps inadequate scepticism about new products. 
Pretending that these factors are not operating is not helpful. What is helpful is to develop 
mechanisms, including analytical roadmaps and better data, to compensate for the cogni-
tive limitations and institutional pressures that are operating.
The question of how regulation should engage with fintech is not one that can be 
answered at one point in time, and so resolved. Regulators must continually gather data 
and roll it back into their own learning and analysis. Relevant data would include not 
only information gathered from within a government-sponsored fintech sandbox, if one 
is in place in the jurisdiction, but also from the broader environment. Regulators must 
ask themselves, continually, whether they still know who the main fintech actors in their 
space are, whether their assumptions still hold true, what might be happening beyond the 
borders of their vision and so on. This requires a substantially different frame of mind, 
and different training, than that which most financial regulators held across most of the 
last century. It also requires courage, independence and the ability to try to imagine how 
to apply regulation’s underlying normative commitments and its goals to continually new 
contexts.
6 Strategic choices
Financial regulators are not passive actors when it comes to private sector financial innova-
tion. While they are subject to a degree to political will, they are still the creators of worlds. 
Careful thinking on their parts about regulatory priorities and regulatory design can be 
profoundly influential.
A regulator will want to decide where its key challenges, in relation to recognising and 
tracking fintech, lie. Different regulatory challenges provoke different regulatory responses. 
For example, in trying to answer the questions above (who is innovating, what the innova-
tions and context are, etc.), the regulator may decide that one of its main challenges is that 
it does not have sufficient data about a particular fast-moving fintech innovation. It could 
then consider regulatory responses designed to slow innovation down and force informa-
tion upward. Licensing and permitting regimes, including for access to a government- 
sponsored fintech sandbox, are one such technique. Alternatively, the regulator may decide 
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that a key challenge is tracking incremental innovation around fintech, where change across 
time may prove to be consequential even if each incremental innovation is not. In that case, 
an appropriate response may be to improve its information-gathering capacity and to estab-
lish benchmarks for safety, investor protection and other regulatory goals that it can track 
across time. If the challenge is identifying fintech innovations at or outside its jurisdictional 
boundaries, a regulator could choose to engage with other regulators in adjacent spaces, 
and to map out the unregulated or under-regulated areas. Quite a bit can be accomplished 
under regulatory authority, through regulatory design choices, even when political will or 
attention is somewhat lacking.
These are subjective choices, which require judgment and expertise. Regulators across 
jurisdictions are already making many of these choices. This chapter seeks to help support 
those efforts, by making explicit the main questions that a regulator should ask when try-
ing to regulate fintech. Approaching questions of regulatory design and regulatory prior-
ities in a more systematic and intentional way, with the understanding that private sector 
innovation is the key challenge that regulators confront today, has the potential to produce 
more comprehensive and better regulatory outcomes.
Financial regulation matters. Regulation is at the operational front line when it comes to 
breathing life into our most cherished social commitments. Seemingly mundane regulatory 
decisions implicate questions of fairness, equality and justice, and thus directly influence 
peoples’ lives and prospects. We see their effects in our politics, and our communities. 
Financial regulation in particular can be the site of some of the most pernicious effects of 
power and domination. In its best forms, however, it can also be the site of broadly dis-
tributed, almost democratic, opportunities for human flourishing. Fintech presents that 
potential as well as those risks, and financial regulators are uniquely positioned to manage 
and help direct it for the benefit of us all.
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